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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins is most famous for its holding that federal courts sitting in
diversity must apply the law of the state and that there is “no federal
general common law.” 1 What the decision is not famous for is identifying

* Sharon K. Sandeen is the Robins Kaplan LLP Distinguished Professor in Intellectual Property Law
and Director of the IP Institute at Mitchell Hamline School of Law in St. Paul Minnesota. The title of
this article and portions of its content are derived from her earlier article, The Evolution of Trade
Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010) (hereinafter The Evolution of Trade Secret Law). Based upon an
examination of hundreds of pages of source documents, including archival records of the American
Bar Association (ABA) and the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), now known as the Uniform Law Commission, that article details the background, history,
and purpose of the Uniform Trade Secret Act, showing that it was primarily designed to limit, rather
than to expand, trade secret protection. In so doing, it tells the story of the active role that various
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the vacuum in law that the decision created and how the then existing
federal general common law would be replaced.
For almost 150 years from the adoption of the Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789 until the Court’s decision in Erie in 1938, the federal judiciary
had developed a body of federal jurisprudence that applied (if not created)
what the federal courts thought was the “general common law.” 2 Then,
with one decision, that body of jurisprudence was rendered moot.
Henceforth, Erie directed federal courts to look to both statutory and
decisional state law in cases that are brought pursuant to the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Ironically, the decision in Erie (which overruled the longstanding
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson 3) was based, in part, on Justice Holmes’s
argument in an earlier case that the Swift doctrine rests on the fallacy that
there is “one august corpus [of common law].” 4 The irony being that if
there was no one corpus of common law, there was not much for the state
courts to rely upon either. Thus, while Erie is primarily about who gets to
decide what the common law is, and the limited power of the federal
courts, the practical effect of the decision was that it left gaps in the law
that took decades to fill. This was particularly true in areas of law where
state common law had not developed sufficiently, like unfair competition
law.
Because much of the federal general common law concerned matters
of commercial law, 5 including principles of unfair competition, Erie’s
effect on unfair competition was substantial. As a commentator of the time
explained:
Whatever the merits of the Tompkins case in other respects, it seems to
me very damaging to the law of Unfair Competition. State litigation in
the field is infrequent. Thus, the argument in favor of the result in the
Tompkins case . . . is of slight efficacy when applied to Unfair
Competition.

lawyers and Bar Associations played in trying to shape the law of unfair competition in the aftermath
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie.
1. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
2. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842); Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson,
24 A.B.A. J. 609, 611–614 (1938) (noting that the Swift doctrine “grew by what it fed on” and
summarizing the issues upon which federal courts applied general common law pre-Erie).
3. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
4. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (J. Holmes dissenting).
5. Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609, 613 (1938)
(“Perhaps the chief beneficiaries of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson were corporations doing business
in a number of states.”).
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Moreover, state doctrines have not been continuously developed. Some
of the few state cases are decades old, decided before judges understood
the problems. There is very little good reasoning on this subject in any
single state, as compared with the extensive and admirable body of
federal law now apparently doomed to destruction. 6

This article tells the story of the efforts undertaken in the aftermath of Erie
to fill the gaps it left in the law of unfair competition. As used herein, the
law of unfair competition refers to causes of action that might be brought
by competitors as opposed to consumer-related, unfair competition
claims. However, there is some overlap in these two areas of law,
particularly with respect to false advertising claims brought by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) or pursuant to so-called state “little-FTC
Acts.” 7
Proceeding chronologically, the first part of this article explains the
scope and nature of the gaps in law that resulted from Erie with a focus
on the law of unfair competition. Part II of this article discusses how
policymakers and members of the bar (particularly the American Bar
Association) attempted to address the gaps in unfair competition law that
Erie left behind, and how the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 8 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. 9 in 1964 effectively limited the scope of those efforts by
creating what I previously dubbed the “Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze.” 10
The squeeze refers to the fact that while the Supreme Court in Erie told
federal courts to look to state common law when sitting in diversity, the
Court later ruled in the Sears and Compco decisions that much of the
unfair competition law of the states was preempted by federal patent law.
Thus, the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze raised serious questions about the
ability of state law to fill the gaps in unfair competition law left by Erie.
Indeed, for a period of time until the Supreme Court decided Kewanee Oil
6. Zechariah. Chafee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1940), as abstracted
in 7 CURRENT LEGAL THOUGHT 3 (1940). Interestingly, despite Professor Chafee’s sentiment, the
American Law Institute (ALI) thought the state law of unfair competition had developed enough so
that it could be restated in the Restatement (First) of the Law of Torts published in 1939.
7. See Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little Ftc Acts”:
Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 375 (1990) (“The passage of state Little
FTC Acts was in large part a response to the deficiencies in the common law as well as the limited
reach of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). Courts interpreted the FTCA’s section
5 enforcement power narrowly to encompass only anti-competitive practices between businesses.”)
(internal citations omitted).
8. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
9. See 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
10. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 507
(2010).
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Co. v. Bicron Corp. 11 in 1974, the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze even
threatened the common law of trade secrecy that had developed in the
United States over the course of more than 100 years. In the concluding
part of this article, the current state of the law governing unfair
competition is summarized leading to the ultimate and ironic conclusion
that eighty years after Erie, the federal courts are back in the business of
developing and refining the common law of unfair competition.
II. THE GAPS LEFT BY ERIE
To understand the gaps in the law that were left in the wake of Erie,
one has to understand what the federal courts at the time of Erie meant by
federal general common law. 12 It is clear that it did not include either
federal or state statutory law; less obvious is that it did not include all
common law, but only a sub-set of the common law that the federal courts
deemed to be general law. The quote from Swift v. Tyson set forth in Erie
explains the distinction:
The true interpretation of the 34th section [of the Federal Judiciary Act]
limited its application to state laws, strictly local, that is to say, to the
positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the
local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent
locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters
immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character. It never
has been supposed by us, that the section did apply, or was designed to
apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon
local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for
example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written
instruments, and especially to questions of general commercial law,
where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions
as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal
analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or instrument, or
what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to
govern the case. 13

As so described, at least at the time of Swift, the general law had three
features that might exist alone or in combination: (1) it is not intraterritorial; (2) it concerns matters of commercial law; and; (3) it requires

11. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
12. The post-Erie definition of this phrase is different. Now, federal general common law refers
to federal decisional law which has interpreted federal statutes and filled gaps in those statutes.
13. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (quoting Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1842)
(emphasis added).
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the application of general reasoning and legal analogies. 14 All three
features apply to unfair competition claims, particularly in diversity cases
where, by definition, the parties are likely to be engaged in interstate
commerce.
A criticism of the Swift doctrine that led to it being overruled by Erie
was that it gave federal judges too much discretion to decide whether an
issue was a matter of general law, often leading them to ignore state law
in situations that appeared to be local and intra-territorial. 15 In Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co. (a decision criticized by Justice Holmes in a dissent ultimately leading
to Erie), for instance, the court considered a case alleging interference
with contract wherein the plaintiff complained that the defendant was not
honoring its exclusive contract with a railroad to provide transportation
and baggage handling services. 16 The defendant countered with the
argument that “the contract is contrary to the public policy and laws of
Kentucky as declared by its highest court, and that it is monopolistic in
excess of the railroad company’s charter power and violates section 214
of the Constitution of the state.” 17 Despite the applicability of the
Kentucky Constitution and the apparent localized nature of the dispute,
however, the Supreme Court refused to apply Kentucky law, explaining:
The cases cited show that the decisions of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals holding such arrangements invalid are contrary to the common
law as generally understood and applied. And we are of opinion that
petitioner here has failed to show any valid ground for disregarding this
contract and that its interference cannot be justified. Care is to be
observed lest the doctrine that a contract is void as against public policy
be unreasonably extended. Detriment to the public interest is not to be
presumed in the absence of showing that something improper is done or
contemplated. 18

14. In the almost 100 years following the Supreme Court’s decision in Swift v. Tyson, the
definition of “general law” had expanded to include most common-law fields, including wills,
contracts, torts, deeds, mortgages, rules of evidence, and measures of damages and industrial
torts. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts, 18901917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931, 947 (2009).
15. Erie, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (“This resulted in part from the broad province accorded to the socalled ‘general law’ as to which federal courts exercised an independent judgment.”), citing H. Parker
Sharp & Joseph B. Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson since 1900, 4 IND. L.
J. 367 (1929).
16. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown 7 Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 528 (1928).
17. Id. at 523.
18. Id. at 528.
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In justifying its refusal to follow the applicable law of Kentucky, the Court
explained: “There is no question concerning title to land. No provision of
state statute or Constitution and no ancient or fixed local usage is
involved.” 19 In other words, if the dispute was not local enough, federal
judges pre-Erie felt free to determine what the law is and, in many cases,
what it should be. 20
The Court in Black & White listed the types of issues that had
previously been considered matters of general law, including:
construction of a will; construction of a deed; what constitutes negligence;
what constitutes dedication of land to the public; the public purpose that
warrants municipal taxation; the liability of common carriers for injury;
the validity of a contract for the carriage of goods; and a railroad’s
responsibility for personal injuries. 21
While not all involve issues of contract or commercial law, each of
the listed types of cases contain one or more of the features of general law
described above, and most involve business or transportation activities.
This suggests that the federal courts before Erie thought that they had an
important role to play in overseeing the business practices of companies
operating across state lines. With this mindset, it is not surprising that a
body of federal unfair competition jurisprudence developed pre-Erie. A
famous example is the Supreme Court’s decision in International News
Service v. Associated Press (INS). 22
Decided in 1918, 20 years before Erie and at a time when the federal
courts were expanding their equity jurisdiction, INS is famous for
recognizing a common law claim for the misappropriation of information,
which is often referred to as the “INS misappropriation doctrine.” 23 INS
involved a lawsuit in equity based on diversity jurisdiction that was
brought by the Associated Press (AP) against International News Service
(INS) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. 24 Without reference to an applicable statute, AP alleged that INS’s
actions of pirating its new stories were inequitable and constituted unfair

19. Id. at 529.
20. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts,
1890-1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931 (2009) (detailing the expanding role of the federal judiciary
between the Supreme Court’s decisions in Swift and Erie, including the expansion of its equity
jurisdiction).
21. Black & White, 276 U.S. at 530–31.
22. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
23. See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International
News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411 (1983) (explaining the common law
development of the INS misappropriation doctrine through the early 1980s).
24. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 229–30.
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competition that should be enjoined. 25 The Supreme Court agreed,
applying the federal general common law of unfair competition that had
developed to that point.
The parties are competitors in this field; and, on fundamental principles,
applicable here as elsewhere, when the rights or privileges of the one are
liable to conflict with those of the other, each party is under a duty so to
conduct its own business as not unnecessarily or unfairly to injure that
of the other. 26

Although not specifically identified, the fundamental principles upon
which the court relied apparently include (as discussed in a cited case
involving a labor dispute) the right of businesses to engage in fair
competition and freedom to contract including with respect to
employment relationships. 27
The district court that first considered the INS case and granted the
injunction on appeal to the Supreme Court succinctly summarized the
federal court’s view of unfair competition circa 1918 with respect to the
perceived wrongful use of information:
The protection of lectures, plays, and paintings from piracy, even after
wide publicity, is sometimes placed by the courts upon rights of authors
to literary or artistic property, and sometimes upon the theory of an
implied contract arising from the relations of the parties. . . . The
question in any given case is whether abandonment to the public has
been so complete that no further justifiable cause remains for protecting
these business interests from competitive interference. They do stand
like trade secrets, in that they are entitled to protection until surrendered
to the public; but the real basis for invoking equitable aid either in the
case of a lecture, a play, or a trade secret is that one who has, with labor
and expense, created something which, while intangible, is yet of value,
is entitled to such protection against damage as is not inconsistent with
public policy. 28

When viewed in the context of current law (discussed in the last part of
this article), the foregoing language reveals how much the law of unfair
competition concerning the protection of information has changed since
1918. This is due to the ancillary effects of Erie, but is also explained by
the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze and developments in U.S. copyright law
25. Id. at 215, 230–31.
26. Id. at 235–36 (1918) (emphasis added), citing Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245
U.S. 229, 254 (1917).
27. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 251–54 (1917).
28. Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 240 F. 983, 992–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), modified, 245
F. 244 (2d Cir. 1917), aff’d, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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including the Supreme Court’s holding in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co. which rejected the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine. 29
Prior to Erie, the federal courts had also developed a robust body of
jurisprudence related to trademarks that was a part of the general law of
unfair competition. 30 In fact, the district court in INS—quoting National
Telegraph News Co. v. Western Union 31 and citing a book on trademark
law written by Professor Langdell—used this law to further justify its
decision. Thus, while unfair competition law was not the only type of
“federal general common law” that was rendered moot by Erie, it was a
very significant part.
Following the decision in Erie, a series of federal cases noted the
changes that Erie caused to the law of unfair competition. An early
example is Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt
& Manufacturing Co. in which the plaintiff, relying upon the reasoning of
INS, alleged that that defendant had misappropriated a business system
originated by it.32 In dismissing the plaintiff’s arguments and ruling in
favor of the defendant in a manner inconsistent with the pre-Erie general
federal common law, the court explained:
It appears that the lower court decided the case upon general Federal
law. At any rate, it is certain that the law of unfair competition, as
announced by the courts of Illinois, was not applied. We are therefore at
the threshold of our consideration met with defendant’s contention that
under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, the law of the state, as announced by its
courts, must be given effect, and that by such law, no cause of action
was stated or proved.
Confronted with this situation, no good purpose could be served in
analyzing the many Federal cases relied upon by plaintiff in support of

29.
30.

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE COMMON LAW 288–310 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (“In the pre-Erie era, it was
reasonably clear that this common law of trademarks and unfair competition was general law,
although there is some controversy about the status of that general law.”).
31. 119 F. 294 (1902). The court in National Telegraph, summarized the federal law of
trademarks as follows:
Nowhere is this recognition by courts of equity of the intangible side of property better
exemplified, than in the remedies recently developed against unfair competition in trade.
An unregistered trade name or mark is, in essence, nothing more than a symbol, conveying
to eye and ear information respecting origin and identity; as if the manufacturer, present
in person, and pointing to the article, were to say, “These are mine”; and the injunctive
remedy applied is simply a command that this form of speech—this method of saying,
These are mine—shall not be intruded upon unfairly by a like speech of another.
32. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Am. Expansion Bolt & Mfg. Co., 124 F.2d 706, 708–
09 (7th Cir. 1941).
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the decree. This is so for the reason that the law of unfair competition,
as announced in Illinois, must be applied. 33

Similarly, in a trademark infringement case based upon diversity
jurisdiction and decided a few years after Erie, the same court held that
“[w]hatever may be the rule in the Federal Court, however, we think the
state court rule must be applied.” 34 As recognized in Philco Corp. v.
Phillips Manufacturing Co., this is true even if the underlying lawsuit is
one sounding in equity. 35 But as also noted in Philco, state law does not
apply to claims based upon infringement of a federal statutory trademark
or unfair competition against a federal statutory trademark. 36
In 1957, nearly 20 years after Erie, a district court summarized the
uncertainty that Erie caused with respect to unfair competition law as
follows:
The law of unfair competition has largely been developed in the federal
courts, and most unfair competition cases are still brought there. Since
Erie, however, many of the federal courts have felt compelled to ignore
their own precedents and rely instead on old state decisions. The result,
as can be seen from reading the federal cases cited in support of Illinois,
law is an endless exegesis on a perhaps antiquated decision instead of a
dynamic approach to decisional law. If the federal courts also feel
themselves bound to follow the conflicts of laws rules of the state in
which they sit, they might be further tying the Gordian knot of interstate
conflicts jumbles. 37

If the state law of unfair competition had been as robust and clear as the
federal general common law of unfair competition or resulted in similar
outcomes, few would have cared. But because unfair competition law was
perceived as having changed dramatically, particularly with respect to its
lack of uniformity (national uniformity as opposed to the type of
33. Id. at 708 (internal citations omitted).
34. Rytex Co. v. Ryan, 126 F.2d 952, 954 (7th Cir. 1942); see also, Pecheur Lozenge Co. v.
Nat’l Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666, 667 (1942) (“The only cause of action that this record could possibly
support is for unfair competition and common law ‘trademark infringement,’ to which local law
applies.”) But see Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113 (1938) (ignoring state law in
the aftermath of Erie by noting “no claim has been made that the local law is any different from the
general law on the subject, and both parties have relied almost entirely on federal precedents.”).
35. Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1943); see also, John R.
Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears Compco: A Plea for a Federal Law of Unfair
Competition, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 16, 25 (1966) (“The result of Erie in the field of unfair
competition, has been a bewildering hodge-podge of conflicting decisions which defies harmonization
into a uniform national body of law.”).
36. 133 F. 2d at 667.
37. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), modified, 253 F.2d 702
(2d Cir. 1958) (internal citations omitted).
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uniformity discussed in Erie), businesses and their attorneys cared a lot as
the following discussion explains.
III. RESPONSES TO CHANGES IN THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
CAUSED BY ERIE
Eighty years removed from the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie, it
is hard to imagine the uproar that Erie caused among the practicing bar
and U.S. business interests. 38 Precisely at the time that the United States
was emerging from the effects of The Great Depression; business and
industry was becoming less localized and more national and international;
and the need for national legal standards became more pronounced, the
Supreme Court prevented federal courts from recognizing and applying
the federal general common law of commerce that many believed
existed. 39 The impact of Erie upon the law of unfair competition was of
particular concern to U.S. business interests. Explaining this impact, one
commentator said: “The Supreme Court has brought to life volcanoes that
existed, but were peacefully dormant, and which now may erupt in such a
manner as to create a chaotic condition in our present-day interstate
economy.” 40
Initially, the concern related to the inability of courts to rely upon
federal precedents to define the parameters of unfair competition in the
United States. 41 Because of Erie, the federal judiciary was out of the
business of developing common law except in connection with the
interpretation and application of federal statutes, meaning the
development and refinement of unfair competition law was left to state

38. See E. Manning Giles, Unfair Competition and the Overextension of the Erie Doctrine, 41
TRADEMARK REP. 1056 (1951); Edward S. Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition Under the
Lanham Act, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 259 (1948); Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to
the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 955 (1942), as reprinted in 32
TRADEMARK REP. 81, 99 (1942); Harry Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L. J. 1336
(1938); see also, Brief in Support of Congressional Passage of Proposed Unfair Competition
Amendment to Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, as reprinted in 57 TRADEMARK REP. 88 (1967)
[hereinafter Brief in Support of Congressional Passage].
39. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 at 78; see also Statement of W.G. Reynolds in Support
of Unfair Activities Bill, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 785 (1964) (noting the swing to direct selling, the
increased importance of advertising, and the “mushrooming of supermarkets” as creating a new
economic environment where federal principles of unfair competition are needed).
40. Zlinkoff, supra note 38 at 90.
41. Id. at 85–86, lamenting that the pre-Erie federal jurisprudence governing trademarks and
unfair competition had been sent to the “scrap heap.”
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courts. 42 However, “the rub was that state law marked time during the
period that federal law was evolving” and had not developed sufficiently
or consistently. 43 Thus, as Erie forced lawyers and their clients to learn
more about principles of unfair competition at the state level, the concern
about the irrelevance of federal precedents was replaced by a fear about
the actual details (or lack thereof) of state unfair competition law. Further
exacerbating this concern was the realization that what state unfair
competition law did exist often lacked uniformity and, pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s 1941 decision in Klaxon v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co., Inc., 44 state conflict of laws rules might require
application of the law of a state other than the state where the lawsuit was
filed. 45 Thus, the concern of the Erie Court about the lack of uniformity
in law as between state and federal courts was replaced by a concern about
the lack of uniformity in the state laws governing unfair competition.
The responses to the lack of national uniformity and the gaps in the
law of unfair competition that Erie caused can be divided into three
periods of time: (1) the period between the Erie decision in 1938 and the
adoption of Lanham Act 46 on July 5, 1946 (the Pre-Legislative Era); (2)
the period between the adoption of the Lanham Act in 1946 and the late
1950s when it became clear that the trend of decisional law would limit
the scope of the Lanham Act (the Federal Code of Unfair Competition
Era); and (3) the period from the late 1950s until the promulgation of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act in 1979 (the Uniform State Law Era). As
further explained in the subsections that follow, the first period was
marked by efforts to limit the scope and application of the Erie doctrine.
During the second period, the focus was on arguing for an expansive
application of the Lanham Act. When both of those efforts failed,
legislative efforts shifted to the adoption of uniform state laws, but as
ultimately constrained by principles of federal preemption.

42. Giles, supra note 38, at 1056 (discussing the difference between federal general common
law and federal common law and noting the power of federal courts to construe and supplement
federal statutory law).
43. National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Revised Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Prefatory Note (1966) (reprinted in Richard F. Dole, Jr., Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act: A Prefatory Note, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 435, 435–36 (1964)).
44. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
45. Zlinkoff, supra note 38 at 88.
46. Lanham Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1141 (2010)); cf. H. M. McLarin, The 1941 Revised Lanham Trade-Mark Bill—Being a
Description and History of the 1941 Revision of the Lanham Trade-Mark Bill, 31 TRADEMARK REP.
87 (1941) (giving the reasons for the Lanham Bill, including the need of modern business for more
certainty).
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The Pre-Legislative Era

In the immediate aftermath of Erie, those who were concerned about
its effects on the law of unfair competition focused most of their time and
effort advocating for its limited application. First and foremost, they noted
that the Erie doctrine did not apply to the federal courts’ interpretation of
matters “governed by the Federal Constitution, or by Acts of Congress,” 47
but they also suggested other restrictions on the scope of the Erie
doctrine. 48 For instance, an argument was made that the Erie doctrine
should not apply to issues of equity, but that argument was quickly
dismissed by the Supreme Court in Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance
Co., decided only a week after Erie in a matter that sought the rescission
of an insurance policy. 49 Without directly addressing the issue of law vs.
equity, the Court matter-of-factly explained: “The parties and the federal
courts must now search for and apply the entire body of substantive law
governing an identical action in the state courts.” 50 Justice Jackson
presented a more nuanced view of the scope of Erie in his concurrence in
D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. when he
argued that the Erie doctrine should be limited to diversity cases and that
federal courts should be allowed to develop and apply federal common
law in all federal question cases. 51 Ultimately, however, the circumstances
allowing federal courts to create federal common law in federal question
cases was limited such that state common law, rather than federal common
law, is often used to fill the gaps that exist in federal statutes.52
In a 1942 article, Sergei Zlinkoff argued that despite the ruling in
Ruhlin, there were several reasons why the effects of Erie on the law of
unfair competition might not be as great as feared. 53 First, he noted “the
47. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 at 78.
48. Robert L. Stearns, Erie Railroad Versus Tompkins: One Year After, 12 ROCKY MNTN. L.
REV. 1 (1939) (summarizing the results of post-Erie diversity cases, including arguments that were
made to distinguish Erie.)
49. Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938). See also, Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945).
50. Ruhlin, 304 U.S. at 209.
51. D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471 (1942).
A federal court sitting in a non-diversity case such as this does not sit as a local tribunal.
In some cases it may see fit for special reasons to give the law of a particular state highly
persuasive or even controlling effect, but in the last analysis its decision turns upon the
law of the United States, not that of any state.
52. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4514-20
(3d ed. 2016). See also, Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal
Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2017) (discussing this rule’s
probable application to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016).
53. Zlinkoff, supra note 38 at 81.
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relative freedom of the federal courts with respect to local law,”
particularly in states where there was not a robust law of unfair
competition. 54 Without clear state law, federal courts would be free to
predict what the state law would be, noting that “[t]he entire body of
jurisprudence upon which a state court would draw is the material out of
which the federal court is free to mold its decision.” 55 Second, he argued
that the federal common law of unfair competition was likely to still be
resorted to by federal courts for two reasons: (1) because inadequate
guidance existed at the state level; and (2) because state court decisions
often were based on federal precedents and doctrines. 56 Buttressing this
argument was his observation that the fact-specific nature of unfair
competition cases would likely make state court precedents
distinguishable anyway. 57 Lastly, he noted the federal common law that
would develop (at least in the area of trademark law) with respect to the
federal court’s interpretation of the federal trademark statutes. 58
With respect to the federal common law that could still develop
concerning the interpretation and application of the U.S. Constitution and
federal statutes, commentators have argued for an expansive view of the
federal courts’ power. 59 In his 1951 article, E. Manning Giles observed
that fears about the scope of Erie were often the result of a failure to
distinguish between federal general common law and federal common law
noting that the Supreme Court has “never squarely considered the
question of whether the federal decisional law of unfair competition is part
of the federal general common law or the federal common law.” 60 Based
upon the body of federal unfair competition statutes that had been adopted
before and since Erie, including the Lanham Act, international treaties,
and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Giles argued that federal
decisional concepts of unfair competition “ceased merely to be part of the
federal general common law and became a part of federal common law.” 61

54. Id. at 90.
55. Id. See also, id. at 93 (“[T]he trend of decisions indicates that if there is a statutory framework, there are almost endless opportunities for the continued application of federal common law as
the source of rules not only for those matters directly within the legislative enactment, but of cognate
and interstitial issues as well.”).
56. Id. at 92.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 93.
60. Giles, supra note 38, at 1059. (emphasis omitted).
61. Giles, supra note 38, at 1058.
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The Federal Code of Unfair Competition Era

While efforts to limit the reach of the Erie doctrine continued, 62
attention was also given to possible legislative solutions to “the Erie
problem,” particularly after the adoption of a federal unfair competition
law which could provide the basis for the development of more federal
common law on the topic. This era had three stages. The first stage
concerned the adoption of the Lanham Act, a process that had started
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie but that did not come to
fruition until 1946. The second stage, which largely overlapped the third
stage, involved efforts to convince the courts to interpret the Lanham Act
as creating a “Federal Code of Unfair Competition” with a broad and
flexible definition of unfair competition. The third stage involved efforts
to amend the Lanham Act to statutorily clarify that it was intended as a
federal law of unfair competition by, among other things, defining
additional acts of unfair competition.
The Federal Code of Unfair Competition Era began with the adoption
of the Lanham Act on July 5, 1946, which went into effect one year later.63
Most accounts of the history of the Lanham Act do not include any
suggestion that it was due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie,
although the Lanham Act’s role in addressing the unfair competition
concerns raised by Erie is readily acknowledged. The more common story
is that the Lanham Act was needed to: (1) address perceived inadequacies
in the scope of existing federal trademark law, particularly with respect to
the protection of unregistered marks that are used in interstate commerce;
(2) comply with international obligations; and (3) stem the proliferation
of state trademark laws advocated by lobbyists for trademark bureaus that
wanted to sell state trademark registration services.64
Work on the federal trademark legislation that would become the
Lanham Act began in the latter part of 1937, approximately six months
before the decision in Erie was rendered. As the story goes, Congressman
Fritz Lanham asked noted intellectual property practitioner and author,
Edward S. Rogers, to share a draft of trademark legislation he prepared in
conjunction with his work with the American Bar Association, Patent
62. See Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59
HARV. L. REV. 966 (1946), as reprinted in 13 CURRENT LEGAL THOUGHT 193, 194–201 (1946)
(describing cases where the Erie doctrine was not applied).
63. Trade-Mark Act of 1946, Pub.L. No. 79–489, 60 Stat. 427 (enacted July 5, 1946).
64. See Sondra Levine, The Origins of the Lanham Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 22, 25–
26 (2004); Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW &
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 173, 177 (1949); Kenneth Perry, State Trade-Mark Legislation, 37
TRADEMARK REP. 283 (1947).
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Section, on earlier legislation known as the Vestal Bill. 65 That began a
nine-year process to adopt the Lanham Act. Throughout this period until
his death in 1949, Edward Rogers was not content to limit his advocacy
to trademark law; he was also a passionate advocate for an expansive view
of unfair competition law and the need for a federal law on the subject. 66
For instance, in 1940, he published an article titled “New Directions in the
Law of Unfair Competition” wherein he discussed what he labeled as the
wrongs of misrepresentation and misappropriation. 67 Then, in 1945, he
wrote an article in which he lamented the gaps in the state law of unfair
competition and suggested legislation based upon the language of the
Paris Convention as amended at London in 1934 to include Article 10bis,
among other provisions. 68
Between Edward Rogers’s original call for a more expansive federal
unfair competition law in 1945, and the introduction of proposed
legislation in 1959 (as described infra), arguments were made
encouraging federal courts to take an expansive view of the Lanham Act.
The focus of these arguments was on § 44(h) of the Lanham Act which
many argued allowed all nature of unfair competition claims affecting
interstate commerce to be brought in federal court.69 Section 44(h) of the
Lanham Act, adopted to comply with Article 10bis, reads:
(h) Any person designated in paragraph (b) of this section as entitled to
the benefits and subject to the provisions of this Act shall be entitled to
effective protection against unfair competition, and the remedies
provided herein for infringement of marks shall be available so far as
they may be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair competition. 70

65. Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW &
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 173, 177 (1949).
66. Edward Rogers’ advocacy with respect to the Lanham Act, and unfair competition law
more generally, are detailed in volume 62 of the Trademark Law Reporter, the “Edward S. Rogers
Memorial Edition,” 62 TRADEMARK REP. 175 (1972).
67. Edward S. Rogers, New Directions in the Law of Unfair Competition, 74 N.Y. L. REV. 317
(1940).
68. Edward S. Rogers, Unfair Competition, 35 TRADEMARK REP. 126, 131 (1945). In pertinent
part, Article 10bis of the Paris Convention states: “(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure
to nationals of such countries effective protection against unfair competition. (2) Any act of
competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of
unfair competition.”
69. See Note, Trade-Marks, Unfair Competition, and the Courts: Some Unsettled Aspects of
the Lanham Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1094, 1101–02 (1953); Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., Unfair
Competition: Uniform State Act Needed, 44 VA. L. REV. 583 (1958), as reprinted in 40 PAT. J. OFF.
SOC’Y 644 (1958) (describing the arguments and the state of the unfair competition law twenty years
after Erie).
70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1126(h) (West 2002) (emphasis added).
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Pursuant to the Stauffer doctrine, the expansive view of the Lanham Act
was accepted for a time in the Ninth Circuit,71 but as more decisional law
under the Lanham Act developed, the jurisdictional scope of the Lanham
Act became more confused and limited and, ultimately, the arguments for
a broad interpretation of § 44(h) did not prevail. 72
Heeding the original call of Edward Rogers, the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York began to advocate for the adoption of a
federal law to govern unfair competition. 73 Designed to take advantage of
the recently developed Lincoln Mills doctrine, which noted the power of
federal courts to develop a body of federal common law with respect to
federal labor statutes, the general goal of a federal unfair competition law
was “to permit the federal courts to resume the fashioning of a uniform
and dynamic body of national unfair competition law without compelling
recourse to variegated or inadequate state precedents, i.e., ‘checker-board
law.’” 74
Beginning with the start of the two-year legislative session in 1959,
Congressman John Lindsay biennially introduced legislation to enact a
federal law of unfair competition that would supplement the earlier
adopted Lanham Act. 75 As set forth in the 1963 version of the bill, the
proposed law would allow “any person damaged or likely to be damaged
by unfair commercial activities in or affecting commerce” to bring a civil

71. Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950).
72. Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., Unfair Competition: Uniform State Act Needed, 44 VA. L. REV.
583 (1958), as reprinted in 40 PAT. J. OFF. SOC’Y 644 (1958) (discussing the development and demise
of the Stauffer doctrine).
73. Peterson, supra note 35; see also Louis Kunin, The Lindsay Bill Before and After the Stiffel
Case, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 731, 736–37 (1964).
From Mr. Rogers’ first draft, after several years of work commenced by the Committee
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, there has now evolved the Lindsay Bill. First introduced in the House in 1959, it
was widely circulated among professional groups and other interested parties. A revised
version was re-introduced in 1961. After further circulation and comment the Bill was
revised again and offered in 1962. Once again, after thorough review by interested groups,
additional amendments were made before a current version of the Bill was introduced in
both the House and Senate in 1963.
Sidney A. Diamond, The Proposed Federal Unfair Commercial Activities Act, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 110
(1962), reprinted in 52 TRADEMARK REP. 104 (1962).
74. Kunin, supra note 73, at 732–33 (citing the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. 448); see also Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of
Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (holding that the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 not only
gave federal courts jurisdiction in labor disputes, but enabled federal courts to “fashion a body of
federal law” to govern such disputes).
75. See H.R. 7833, 86th Cong. (1st Sess. 1959); H.R. 10038, 87th Cong. (2d Sess. 1962); S.
1036, 87th Cong. (1st Sess. 1961); S. 2784, 87th Cong. (2d Sess. 1962); S. 1038, 88th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1963).
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action in federal court to obtain injunctive relief, costs, and reasonable
attorney fees. 76 Unfair commercial activities were defined to include “the
commission for purposes of profit of any . . . act or practice which . . .
violates reasonable standards of commercial ethics.”77 In order to
overcome the reluctance of common law courts to grant relief in cases
where there was no direct competition and no proof of actual damages,
the legislation further provided that injunctive relief could be granted
despite the “absence of competition between the parties or actual damage
to the person seeking protection.” 78
The Lindsay Bill received its first and apparently only formal hearing
in June of 1964. 79 Congressman Lindsay explained: “The basic purpose
of the bill is to create a Federal statutory cause of action that could be
invoked by an injured party as an alternative to the common law tort of
unfair competition in cases where interstate commerce is affected.”80 In
his testimony supporting the legislation, W.G. Reynolds, then President
of the United States Trademark Association, noted the legislation would
fulfill three needs:
(a) a sore need to fill-in missing gaps in existing remedies against unfair
commercial activities; (b) a need for modernizing these remedies to cope
with drastic changes that have been going on all about us in the field of
interstate commerce, and (c) a need for encouragement to reputable
businessmen who are bewildered and puzzled by the failure of the
present law to provide relief commensurate with the shifting wrongs
which they are encountering in their day to day business activities. 81

Despite over six years of effort, the Lanham Act was never amended as
proposed, effectively limiting the scope of the Lanham Act to the wrongs
that are defined in § 32 with respect to registered marks and § 43 with
respect to unregistered marks. 82
76. H.R. 4651 and S. 1038, 88th Cong. (1st Sess. 1963).
77. Id. at § 3(d).
78. Id. at § 4.
79. Walter J. Derenberg, The Seventeenth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 655, 656–57 (1964) (noting first hearing on Lindsay Bill and
opposition thereto from the Attorney General’s Office and the Federal Trade Commission).
80. Hearing on H.R. 4651 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the H. Comm.
on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong. 9 (1964) (statement of Rep. Lindsay).
81. Statement of W.G. Reynolds in Support of Unfair Activities Bill, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 785,
785 (1964).
82. Trade Mark Act, Pub. L. 489, 79th Cong. (July 5, 1946). As originally adopted, section
43(a) of the Lanham Act provided that:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any
false description or representation, including words of other symbols tending falsely to
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The need for a federal law to govern unfair competition became more
urgent in 1964 as a result of the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze. In the
companion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. and Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., decided on the same date in March 1964, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Illinois unfair competition law prohibiting
product simulation was preempted by federal patent law. 83 This created a
dilemma for business interests concerned about the development of unfair
competition law in the United States, particularly since Illinois was one
of the first and foremost states to recognize that, in the absence of a statute,
unfair competition law was to be governed by state common law. 84
Having learned from Erie that the federal judiciary had a limited role in
the development of common law, the practicing bar was shocked to learn
that the very entities that were charged with developing unfair competition
law—state courts and legislatures—were prevented by principles of
federal preemption from adopting state laws that interfered with federal
patent policies. 85
John Peterson, then Chairman of the Unfair Competition Committee
of the American Patent Law Association (now the American Intellectual
Property Law Association), expressed the concerns of the practicing bar:
The sweeping language of the Court in Sears and Compco has made it
uncertain how these decisions are to be applied in subsequent cases
presenting differing factual situations, and whether they are to be limited

describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of
origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used
in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to
a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin
or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
Id. Section 43 of the Lanham Act was subsequently amended seven times since 1988, first in a manner
that more clearly specified the wrongs of false advertising and trade disparagement in section 43(a)
(15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), and later to include the wrongs of trademark dilution (15 U.S.C. § 1125(c))
and cyber-squatting (15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)). See Pub. L. 100-667, Title I, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946 (Nov.
16, 1988); Pub. L. 102-542, § 3(c), 106 Stat. 3568 (Oct. 27, 1992); Pub. L. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat.
985 (Jan. 16, 1996); Pub. L. 106-43, §§ 3(a)(2), 5, 113 Stat. 219, 220 (Aug. 5, 1999); Pub. L. 106113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-545 (Nov. 29, 1999); Pub. L. 109-312, § 2, 120
Stat. 1730 (Oct. 6, 2006); Pub. L. 112-190, § 1(a), 126 Stat. 1436 (Oct. 5, 2012).
83. See generally Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
84. See Baird, supra note 23, at 425–27.
85. See Ciro A. Gamboni, Unfair Competition Protection after Sears and Compco, 55
TRADEMARK REP. 964, 969–70 (1965).
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to cases of product simulation or are to be extended to the whole field
of unfair competition. 86

The practicing bar was so concerned about the impact of the Sears and
Compco decisions that the United States Trademark Association (now the
International Trademark Association or INTA) regularly reported on
developments in the area of state unfair competition in a section of an
annual review of the Lanham Act labeled “Unfair Competition and the
Sears-Compco Doctrine,” lauding any decision that appeared to limit
application of the Sears/Compco doctrine. 87
An obvious solution to the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze was the
enactment of federal legislation along the lines of the Lindsay Bill.
However, concerned members of the bar were not content to leave a
solution up to Congress, particularly because the Lindsay Bill had not
progressed much in five years. 88 Apparently, the critical difficulty in
enacting such a law revolved around the definition of unfair competition.
As previously noted, some proponents of a federal law of unfair
competition favored broad, general language that might prohibit still
unknown forms of unfair competition. 89 Others were fearful of an openended definition and advocated for the specification of actionable
wrongful acts. 90 Thus, in addition to federal legislation, various other
strategies were pursued including: arguments made in a variety of cases
to limit the effects of the Erie, Sears, and Compco decisions; proposed
amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act; and the adoption of a
state Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 91 Proposals were also made
86.
87.

Peterson, supra note 35, at 28.
See, e.g., H. Bowen Wands, Priority: Lanham Act or Model State Trademark Bill?, 58
TRADEMARK REP. 801 (1968); Walter J. Derenberg, The Twenty-Fifth Year of Administration of the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 393, 499 (Aug. 1972); Walter J. Derenberg,
The Twenty-Fourth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 61 TRADEMARK
REP. 257, 322 (July 1971); Walter J. Derenberg, The Twenty-Third Year of Administration of the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 60 TRADEMARK REP. 387, 462 (Aug. 1970); Walter J. Derenberg,
The Twenty-Second Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 59 TRADEMARK
REP. 625, 712 (Aug. 1969); Kenneth B. Germain, The Thirty-Fourth Year of Administration of the
Lanham Act of 1946, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 285, 495 (July–Aug. 1981); Peterson, supra note 35, at
776; Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 735.
88. Peterson, supra note 35, at 45 (“This Bill, representing the distillation of years of hard and
painstaking effort, has produced reactions ranging from enthusiastic support to bitter
denunciation. . . . [I]t has been attacked for its vagueness, for its failure to give definition to the term
‘unfair commercial activity,’ and for extending the law beyond the bounds of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.”).
89. Supra notes 67–76.
90. Infra notes 99-104.
91. Peterson, supra note 35, at 28–48; see also Peterson, supra note 35, at 55, n.181 (giving a
history of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act); supra note 66 (providing citations for the
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for the adoption of federal legislation to make it clear that patent law was
not intended to preempt state trade secret law. 92
The practicing bar’s interest in solving the Erie/Sears/Compco
squeeze was so great that a National Coordinating Committee consisting
of over 36 professional associations was formed in order to find a
solution. 93 Members of this committee included the American Patent Law
Association, the United States Trademark Association, and the PTC
Section of the American Bar Association. 94 As detailed in the 1966 Report
of Committee 402, the PTC was frequently asked to consider what it
referred to as the perennial Lindsay Bill.95 In 1962, a resolution favoring
the legislation was defeated by a margin of 75 to 66. 96 In 1963 and 1964,
however, resolutions favoring the bill were passed. 97 Two reasons were
given for support of the Lindsay Bill: the need to replace variegated state
precedents resulting from Erie and the need to resolve the federal-state
conflict noted in the Sears and Compco cases. 98
When the Lindsay Bill stalled in Congress, its supporters proposed
to effectuate its purposes by amending the Lanham Act. 99 There followed
additional efforts by members of the PTC and the National
Coordinating Committee to fashion legislation that would be acceptable
to both the practicing bar and members of Congress. 100 Known as the
McClellan Bill, after the Senator who introduced it and denominated the

Unfair Competition and the Sears-Compco Doctrine section in the Trademark Rep., which cites cases
relevant to this discussion).
92. Roger M. Milgrim, Trade Secrets, Interference with Contracts, and Related Matters, 1974
A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 252–53 [hereinafter
Trade Secrets 1974] (detailing resolutions to this effect since 1969); Richard F. Dole, Jr., Trade
Secrets, Interference with Contracts, and Related Matters, 1973 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 173–74 [hereinafter Trade Secrets 1973].
93. Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 89–90, n.5.
94. Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 89–90, n.5–n.6.
95. Dayton R. Stemple, Jr., Unfair Competition, 1966 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 126 [hereinafter Unfair Competition 1966]; cf. Boynton
P. Livingston, Unfair Competition, 1963 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 164 [hereinafter Unfair Competition 1963] (demonstrating that at the time
of the drafting of the UTSA, Committee 402 was the committee charged with considering issues
related to the law of unfair competition, including “state and federal laws relating to trade secrets,”
“problems arising out of violations of trade secrets and inducement of breach of contract,” and “other
possible forms of unfair competition”).
96. Unfair Competition 1966, supra note 93, at 126.
97. Unfair Competition 1966, supra note 93, at 126.
98. Louis Kunin, Unfair Competition, 1964 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 108-09.
99. Tom Arnold, A Federal Unfair Competition Law, McClellan S. 3681, 89th Cong., 57
TRADEMARK REP. 116, 117 (1967).
100. Unfair Competition 1966, supra note 93, at 127–28.

2018]

ERIE/SEARS/COMPCO SQUEEZE

443

Unfair Competition Act of 1966, this legislation differed from the Lindsay
Bill in a number of respects. 101 Most notably, rather than establishing a
separate federal law of unfair competition, it proposed various
amendments to § 43 of the Lanham Act. 102 Among its proposed provisions
was new § 43(a)(4), which would have imposed civil liability on any
person who engaged “in any act, trade practice, or course of conduct” that
“results or is likely to result in the wrongful disclosure or
misappropriation of a trade secret or other research or development or
commercial information maintained in confidence by another[.]” 103
As described in a brief in support of the McClellan Bill, the
legislation was needed to: (1) fill the gaps in the common law of unfair
competition that were left by Erie; (2) resolve conflicting state rulings and
approaches; (3) eliminate the conflict of laws problem resulting from
increased interstate commerce; (4) foster greater uniformity; (5) provide
a framework for the development of a federal common law of unfair
competition; and (6) provide for remedies consistent with those provided
under the patent and copyright statutes. 104 In other words, like the UTSA
that followed it, the McClellan Bill was not designed simply to codify
existing principles of unfair competition law; it was designed to alter those
principles in several respects.
Debate about the proposed Unfair Competition Act of 1966 included
whether the Act should include a broad catch-all provision or be limited
to a specific list of actionable wrongs. 105 A compromise was struck to
include specific examples of unfair competition followed by a generic
definition of unfair competition that (consistent with the language of
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention) prohibited any act that “is
otherwise contrary to commercial good faith or to normal and honest
practices of the business or activity in which he is engaged[.]” 106 With

101. Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 91.
102. See S. 3681, 89th Cong. (1967); S. 1154, 90th Cong. (1968).
103. See id.
104. Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 88–89.
105. Unfair Competition 1966, supra note 93, at 128 (“The generic approach of the Lindsay bill
and the proposed amendment to the Lanham Act appears to be favored now by a large majority”).
106. Unfair Competition 1966, supra note 93, at 130; see also Brief in Support of Congressional
Passage, supra note 38, at 104; cf. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Limits of Trade Secret Law: The Story of
Article 39 of TRIPS and the Limited Scope of Trade Secret Protection in the United States, in THE
LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Rochelle
Dreyfuss & Katherine Strandburg, eds., 2011) (explaining that a similar compromise was reached in
the drafting of Article 39 of the World Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (the TRIPS Agreement), following the United States’s proposal to add trade
secret misappropriation to the list of acts of unfair competition specifically recognized by the
international community).
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respect to the proposed trade secret provision, an issue arose about how to
draft the language so it would cover information that was not absolutely
secret; in other words, information that is only relatively secret because it
is disclosed to another in the course of a confidential relationship. 107
C.

The Uniform State Law Era

At the same time federal legislation was being pursued, members of
the practicing bar also undertook efforts to fill gaps in state unfair
competition law through, among other means, the adoption of uniform
state laws, including the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(UDTPA). 108 As described in minutes of a meeting of the Unfair
Competition Committee of NCCUSL, efforts to adopt what would
become the UDTPA began in 1958 when the PTC section of the ABA
requested that NCCUSL “study and draft a uniform state law on unfair
competition.” 109 Although it was recognized that there were several forms
of unfair competition, it was determined that the law of unfair competition
should be divided into the following two general areas for purposes of the
adoption of uniform laws: “An Act dealing with false, confusing or
deceptive trade identification and false, confusing or deceptive

107. Brief in Support of Congressional Passage, supra note 38, at 101 (“A problem area stems
from the fact that most alleged secrets are secrets only in a qualified sense: secret for one purpose but
not for another, secret from one person or group of persons but not from another.”).
108. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1966); cf. Kunin, supra note 71, at 734–35 (demonstrating that other
strategies and theories for resurrecting a federal body of unfair competition law were attempted
without success); e.g. Kunin, supra note 71, at 735, n.42 (citing Nat’l Fruit Prods. Co. v. DwinnelWright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942)) (explaining that beginning in 1942, there was a series
of cases in which plaintiffs argued that § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act created a private
right of action that would allow individuals and businesses to bring a suit in federal court.); Kunin,
supra note 71, at 735, n.39 (citing Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950)) (demonstrating
that in 1950, the Ninth Circuit took the position that §§ 44(b), (h), and (i) of the Lanham Act conferred
federal jurisdiction over unfair competition claims); Kunin, supra note 71, at 733–34, n.26
(citing Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs., 269 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1959)) (stating that there
was a series of cases, beginning with Kemart Corp., in which it was contended that the unfair
competition provisions of the Paris Convention and the Inter-American Convention were selfexecuting and, therefore, the “supreme law of the land” under the U.S. Constitution and that, as a
result, federal courts were authorized to develop a federal body of unfair competition law); Kunin,
supra note 71, at 375, n.43 (citing L’Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. LanaLobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir.
1954)) (arguing that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act should be interpreted to cover ordinary cases of
passing off and product simulation).
109. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings of the
Committee of the Whole Uniform Trade Practices Act, at 1-2 (August 4, 1962).
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representations as to the source or origin of goods; [and] an Act dealing
with trade secrets and confidential disclosures.” 110
Thus, the UDTPA does not contain a trade secret provision. Nor does
it specifically address other behaviors that the common law of state and
federal courts, pre-Erie, deemed unfair, like those described in INS.
Instead, it focuses on the behaviors that are also covered by § 43 of the
Lanham Act; An obvious goal being to provide a possible state claim for
relief where the interstate commerce requirements of the Lanham Act
could not be met.
Professor Richard Dole, who also was actively involved in the
promulgation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (discussed infra), was
involved in drafting the UDTPA. In his 1964 article on the topic, he
described the state of unfair competition law that precipitated the
enactment of the UDTPA:
Deceptive conduct constituting unreasonable interference with
another’s promotion and conduct of business is part of a heterogeneous
collection of legal wrongs known as “unfair trade practices.” This type
of conduct is notoriously undefined. Commonly referred to as “unfair
competition,” its metes and bounds have not been charted. 111

Ultimately adopted by NCCUSL at its August 1964 meeting and
subsequently adopted by 11 states, 112 the UDTPA was designed “to bring
state law up to date by removing undue restrictions on the common-law
action of deceptive trade practices.” 113
Although the UDTPA singled out certain objectionable practices
(namely, misleading trade identification and false or deceptive
advertising), it was intended to leave courts “free to fix the proper ambit
of the Act in case-by-case adjudications.” 114 As explained in the Prefatory
Note to the UDTPA:
In 1958 the Section of Patents, Trademark and Copyright Law of the
American Bar Association passed a resolution which stated that “there
should be uniformity in the law of unfair competition among the
respective states.” . . . Since the provisions of the Lindsey Bill and of the

110. Id.; see also, Letter from Frances D. Jones, Executive Secretary of NCCUSL, to G.M.
Fuller, Esq. (December 7, 1966).
111. Richard F. Dole, Jr., Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: A Prefatory Note, 54
TRADEMARK REP. 435, 435 (1964).
112. Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Oklahoma, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Mexico, and Ohio. Other states have unfair competition statutes, but they did not adopt the
UDTPA. See e.g., Calif. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17209.
113. Dole, Jr., supra note 111, at 436.
114. Dole, Jr., supra note 111, at 436.
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Uniform Act are sufficiently similar, the main question is the route by
which uniformity is obtained–voluntary adoption by the state
legislatures or by a federal act imposing a particular rule on the states.
The Uniform Act is designed to bring state law up to date by removing
undue restrictions on the common law action for deceptive trade
practices. Certain objectionable practices are singled out, but courts are
left free to fix the proper ambit of the act in case by case adjudication. 115

Thus, in the same way that the Lindsay legislation was designed both to
fill the vacuum in unfair competition law that was left by Erie and provide
more uniformity, certainty, and clarity in the law of unfair competition,
the UDTPA was designed to supplement and change a body of common
law that was thought to be deficient.
Although nothing happened at NCCUSL with respect to a uniform
trade secrets act between 1958 and late 1968, in 1966 the PTC decided to
consider the need for a uniform trade secret law. 116 While Committee 402
of the PTC convened to consider the advisability of a federal unfair
competition law that included provisions regarding trade secrets,
Committee 107, Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, was
considering related questions. 117 The principal concern of Committee 107
was that the scope of trade secret protection varied from state to state,
particularly with respect to the treatment of departing
employees. 118 Concern was also expressed that the proposed amendments
to the Lanham Act would not eliminate the need for state law and that
inconsistency in the laws of various states was leading to forum
shopping. 119 In 1968, a resolution favoring the adoption of a uniform trade
secrets act was approved by the PTC and, consistent with a longstanding relationship between the ABA and NCCUSL, the matter was

115. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1966).
116. James M. Heilman, Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, 1967 A.B.A. SEC.
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 107, at 59 [hereinafter Protection of
Confidential Rights 1967]; Robert E. Isner, Trade Secrets, Interference with Contracts and Related
Matters, 1967 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 140.
117. G. Franklin Rothwell, Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, 1966 A.B.A. SEC.
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 107, at 63.
118. See Protection of Confidential Rights 1967, supra note 116, at 59–61.
119. Leonard B. Mackey, Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, 1968 A.B.A. SEC.
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 107, at 68 (“Recent proliferation of various
state statutes, each taking a slightly different tack than the others, may create a pattern of legislation
resulting in the situs determining the protection to be afforded the owner of a trade secret. This is
undesirable. It is deemed highly desirable that the problem be approached through the enactment of a
uniform act by states in addition to any amendment of Federal statutes.”).
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referred to NCCUSL for further handling. 120 The 1968 resolution by the
PTC supporting a uniform trade secrets act, together with expressions of
support from other interested parties, provided the impetus for a trade
secret project. 121
The resurrected uniform trade secrets act project began with the
formation within NCCUSL of a Special Committee on Uniform Trade
Secrets Protection Act (hereinafter the Special Committee) chaired by
Commissioner Joseph McKeown and the preparation of a report by
Professor Richard Dole on the current state of trade secret law. 122 In
August 1972 at the Annual Meeting of NCCUSL held in San Francisco,
the proposed UTSA received its first reading. 123 According to a verbatim
transcript of the first reading, the focus of the NCCUSL Commissioners’
early discussions was on four broad policy questions. 124 But the question
was also raised whether a uniform law was needed at all. As a NCCUSL
Commissioner explained: “Any time I approach a proposal for legislation,
my first question is: Which is better in this area, the common law process
or legislation?” 125 The answer to this question helps explain not only the
purpose of the UTSA, but also its meaning and import. Professor Dole
responded that he thought the UTSA could resolve a number of abuses
that were occurring under the common law, and what he referred to as the

120. Edward C. Vandenburgh, Resolution 14, 1968 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 95 at 68; cf. Relationship between American Bar Association and
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (explaining that the NCCUSL was
created in 1892 upon the recommendation of the ABA); Instructions for ABA Advisors to Drafting
Committees of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (February 1, 1979)
(demonstrating that the by-laws of NCCUSL specifically require that it notify and consult with the
appropriate committee or section of the ABA); NCCUSL Drafting Committee Status Report (1978–
1979) (demonstrating that at the time of the adoption of the UTSA in 1979, Edward T. McCabe was
the ABA liaison to the NCCUSL Drafting Committee on Uniform Trade Secrets).
121. See, e.g., Letter from the American Chemical Society to Allison Dunham of NCCUSL
(April 13, 1969).
122. Letter from Allison Dunham, Executive Director of NCCUSL, to Albert F. James, Jr. (July
30, 1969) (“Professor Richard Dole of the University of Iowa prepared a study report for this
committee which has just been circulated to the chairman of the committee. . . . The reporter, Richard
Dole, has just been made a Commissioner from Iowa which may present some awkwardness in his
being reporter for another Commissioner.”).
123. National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Proceedings of the
Committee of the Whole Uniform Trade Secrets Protection Act, (August 4–11, 1972) [hereinafter
1972 Proceedings on Uniform Trade Secrets].
124. Id. at 8-24.
125. Id. at 31, comments of Commissioner Keeton. See also Trade Secrets 1973, Subcomm. C
Report, supra note 92, at 179 (posing the question “whether it might be preferable to rely on common
law rather than upon a statutory solution in cases involving misappropriation”).
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preemption problem—the preemption problem referring to Sears,
Compco, and their progeny. 126
Following the first reading of the proposed UTSA in August of 1972,
work on the project continued both at NCCUSL and the ABA. 127 With the
decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp. 128 in May 1973, however, the entire project was put on hold
due to doubts about the ability of states to legislate in the area of trade
secret law. 129 The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kewanee was the third in a
series of post-Sears/Compco cases that created doubt about the continued
viability of claims for trade secret misappropriation based upon state
law. 130 The first was the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins, in which the Court overturned the well-established doctrine of
licensee estoppel and held that patent licensees could challenge the
validity of patents that were the subject of their licenses. 131 The second
was the decision in Painton & Company, Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., in which
the district court refused to enforce the trade secret provisions of a
manufacturing agreement, finding a conflict with patent policy. 132 When
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court’s decision
in Painton in 1971, the practicing bar breathed a sigh of relief. 133 For over
two years thereafter, it was assumed that trade secret law could co-exist
with patent law. That assumption changed when the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals rendered its decision in Kewanee. 134
With the conflicting decisions and reasoning of the circuit courts
in Kewanee and Painton, circumstances were ripe for the U.S. Supreme
Court to decide whether state trade secret law was preempted by federal
126. Id. at 32-33; see also supra Part III.B (explaining that the “pre-emption problem” refers to
the implications of the Sears/Compco decisions on state trade secret law).
127. Letter to William H. Adams, III from Joseph McKeown (April 13, 1973); Trade Secrets
1973, Subcomm. C Report, supra note 90, at 179; Letter to Special Committee Members from Joseph
McKeown (July 5, 1973).
128. 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).
129. Trade Secrets 1973, Subcomm. C Report, supra note 90, at 180 (“The future of our efforts
and those of the National Conference with respect to the promulgation and adoption of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act will remain in doubt unless and until the Congress enacts legislation negating any
federal intent to preempt state causes of action for unfair competition.”). See also Trade Secrets 1974,
supra note 92, at 254 (noting that no activity was taken with respect to the UTSA pending the outcome
of the Kewanee case).
130. See Roger M. Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matter, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 17, 25–32 (1971); Joseph P. Zammit, The Ghost of Sears-Compco Is Finally Laid to Rest (Or
is It?), 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 37–40 (1975).
131. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
132. 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
133. 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
134. 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).
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patent law. The Court’s 1974 decision that Ohio’s common law of trade
secrecy was not preempted by U.S. patent law solved the preemption
problem in part, allowing efforts to craft a uniform trade secrets act to
resume in late 1975. 135 The UTSA was finally approved by NCCUSL at
its annual meeting in August 1979, over forty-years after
Erie. 136 However, despite the fact that trade secret claims based upon state
law (at least as defined by the Supreme Court in Kewanee) were not
preempted by U.S. patent law, the possibility of federal preemption of
state unfair competition law remains as a constraint on the ability of states
to regulate in the area of unfair competition, as does the language of the
UTSA itself. 137
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S. UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
As a result of the foregoing history, unfair competition law in the
United States is an amalgamation of federal and state statutes,
international law, and state and federal common law. But it is a body of
law that is limited in scope due to the principle of free competition that
undergirds U.S. law 138 and the principles of federal preemption that are
expressed in Sears, Compco, Kewanee, and § 301 of the 1976 Copyright
Act. 139 Thus, while Erie seemingly required the development of a robust
body of state common law to govern unfair competition, that law never
materialized. Moreover, the broad and amorphous definition of unfair
competition urged by Edward Rogers, Richard Dole, and others has not
been adopted as federal law—except to the extent it is encompassed in the
Federal Trade Commission’s application of the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914 (discussed infra). 140
135. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
136. National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Proceedings of the
Committee of the Whole Uniform Trade Secrets Act (August 6–7, 1979).
137. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); 17 U.S.C. §301
(2012); see also Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 7 (1979).
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 38 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
139. See Guy A. Rub, A Less-Formalistic Copyright Preemption, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 327
(2017) (discussing the scope of copyright preemption); Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited:
Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Property Law to Determine the Issue of Federal
Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 301 (2008) (discussing the scope of patent
preemption as applied to trade secret law); Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation Is Seventy-Five Years
Old; Should We Bury It or Revive It?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 781, 807–808 (1994) (describing how
principles of federal preemption restrain the INS misappropriation doctrine); Federal Preemption of
State Unfair Competition Laws., 78 HARV. L. REV. 177, 309 (1964) (discussing the Sears/Compco
cases).
140. Some states have adopted such a definition, notably California which adopted Business
and Professions Code §17200 in 1941.
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In 1995, following most of the major developments in U.S. unfair
competition law post-Erie, the American Law Institute (ALI) issued a
separate volume on unfair competition law, divorcing it from the
Restatement of Torts where it previously resided. Although lengthy,
consisting of over 600 pages with case citations, it illustrates the limited
scope of the modern law of unfair competition in the United States as it
covers only four topics: (1) the freedom to compete; (2) deceptive
marketing; (3) the law of trademarks; and (4) appropriation of trade
values. It also demonstrates how much this law is based upon statutes as
opposed to state common law. As explained in the Forward to the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition:
Federal and state statutes play a significant, sometimes dominant role in
many of the substantive areas encompassed within this Restatement. For
the most part the federal legislation does not preempt state law, and both
federal and state unfair competition statutes generally rely without
significant elaboration on concepts derived from the common law. The
interstate character of modern business accentuates the interest in
uniformity—an interest advanced by a consistent interpretation of both
the common law rules and derivative statutory provisions that define the
boundaries of fair competition. Except as otherwise noted, the principles
discussed in this Restatement are applicable to actions at common law
and to the interpretation of analogous federal and state statutory
codifications. 141

The relevant federal laws include the Lanham Act, § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 142 and the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016. 143
There are also a variety of other federal laws and regulations that regulate
the behaviors of competitors in certain circumstances, including antitrust
laws and U.S. patent and copyright law. 144 At the state level, the principal
laws governing unfair competition are the Uniform Trade Secret Act (now
adopted by 48 of 50 states and all U.S. Territories) 145 and the Uniform
Deceptive Practices Act or similar statutes, often referred to as little FTC

141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, Forward (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
143. See, respectively: 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011).
144. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts,
1890–1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931, 939 (2009) (“[T]he common-law language of the Sherman
Antitrust Act . . . effectively delegated to the federal courts a new authority for shaping national policy
through the guise of statutory construction.”).
145. See National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Legislative Fact SheetTrade Secrets Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (2018), [http://www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act [https://perma.cc/H23N-XH8U].
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Acts. 146 Many states have also adopted laws and regulations that regulate
various behaviors and aspects of competition within specific industries. 147
Before Erie, there were federal trademark statutes and a rich body of
federal jurisprudence governing registered trademarks, with unregistered
trademarks being governed by state law or the federal general common
law invalidated by Erie. 148 In fact, as Mark McKenna has noted, both
before and after Erie, it was the federal courts, rather than Congress or
state courts and legislatures, that developed most of trademark law’s
substantive rules. 149 Since Erie, unfair competition law in the form of the
federal, state, and common law of trademarks has continued to evolve and
has expanded greatly despite the fact that § 44(h) of the Lanham Act was
not interpreted as broadly as some would have liked. 150 This is primarily
the result of an expansive view of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act that started
to take root in the late 1960s 151 and subsequent amendments to § 43 that
expanded the types of wrongs that are actionable under the Lanham
Act. 152
A critical change from pre-Erie law to post-Erie law that was
included in the Lanham Act was the extension of federal trademark law
to unregistered marks that are used in interstate commerce 153 and the
expansion of federal trademark law as a result of amendments to the
Lanham Act. Now, in addition to trademark infringement, false
advertising, and trade disparagement as defined by § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, the Lanham Act also prohibits trademark dilution and
cybersquatting. 154 Although state statutes and state common law continue
to exist and evolve in parallel with federal law, because of the broad
interpretation of interstate commerce under the Lanham Act, federal
trademark law—including applicable federal common law—dominates
trademark practice in the United States.
According to the ALI, the appropriation of trade values referenced in
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition refers to a number of
146. See National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Protection in the States, STATE-BY-STATE
SUMMARIES OF UDAP STATUTES, (January 10, 2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
udap/analysis-state-summaries.pdf [https://perma.cc/C83Q-84HJ].
147. Id.
148. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. (1938).
149. Mark McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE COMMON LAW 288, 288–310 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed., 2013).
150. Id.
151. Kenneth B. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) Lanham Act: You’ve
Come a Long Way, Baby, Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L. J. 85 (1973).
152. Supra note 80.
153. Id.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
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possible civil claims, including: (1) trade secret misappropriation; (2) the
violation of rights of publicity in one’s identity; and (3) applicable federal
and state statutes, breach of contract claims, and common law copyright
claims. 155 Specifically, § 38 of the Restatement of Unfair Competition
states:
One who causes harm to the commercial relations of another by
appropriating the other’s intangible trade values is subject to liability to
the other for such harm only if:
a)

the actor is subject to liability for an appropriation of the other’s
trade secret under the rules stated in §§ 39-45; or

b) the actor is subject to liability for an appropriation of the
commercial value of the other’s identity under the rules stated
in §§ 46-49; or
c)

the appropriation is actionable by the other under federal or
state statutes or international agreements, or is actionable as a
breach of contract, or as an infringement of common law
copyright as preserved under federal copyright law. (Emphasis
added.)

Of these categories, trade secret law is now largely governed by state and
federal statutes with only New York still clinging to state common law. 156
Similarly, approximately half of the states have adopted rights of publicity
statutes. 157 With the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act and subsequent
amendments thereto—including the recent Music Modernization Act—
so-called common law copyrights are sparse. 158 Thus, overall, the
existence of federal and state statutes means that the common law of
unfair competition now largely consists of state and federal decisional law
interpreting the relevant statutes but with some narrowly tailored common
law claims thrown in.
Conspicuously absent from the text of § 38 of Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition is the INS misappropriation doctrine and other
common law theories of unfair competition. Rather, the comments to § 38
note that the INS misappropriation doctrine has had little enduring

155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, Chapter 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
156. Supra note 143.
157. See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Law, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY,
https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/law [https://perma.cc/ZZX5-NQSQ] (online database of
state rights of publicity law).
158. See Zvi S. Rosen, Common-Law Copyright, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055 (2018) (detailing the
scope of common law copyright before the adoption of the Music Modernization Act of 2018).
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effect. 159 This makes sense when one realizes that the INS
misappropriation doctrine was effectively overruled by Erie, as it
constituted federal general common law as opposed to federal common
law. 160 Additionally, although some states since Erie adopted the
principles of INS as state law, such claims are often precluded or
preempted. 161 For instance, in many states that adopted the UTSA,
common law causes of action related to the protection of information not
qualifying as trade secrets are precluded by § 7 of the UTSA which states:
EFFECT ON OTHER LAW. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b),
this [Act] displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this
State providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret. (b)
This [Act] does not affect: (1) contractual remedies, whether or not
based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; (2) other civil remedies
that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or (3) criminal
remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade
secret. 162

Although poorly drafted because it uses the term trade secret when it
meant competitively significant information not qualifying for trade secret
protection, § 7 of the UTSA has been interpreted to mean that all state tort
claims based upon state common law or statutes related to the protection
of information not qualifying as a trade secret are precluded by the
UTSA. 163 Moreover, depending upon the underlying facts and whether the
information that is alleged to have been taken under a common law
misappropriation theory is protected by copyright or falls into the scope
of patentable subject matter, an INS claim may also be preempted by §
301 of the U.S. Copyright Act or the principles annunciated in Sears,
Compco, and Kewanee.
The U.S. unfair competition law with the broadest potential scope is
the Federal Trade Commission Act because it outlaws “unfair methods of

159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 38, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
160. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 894 (2nd Cir. 2011)
(“INS itself is no longer good law. Purporting to establish a principal of federal common law, the law
established by INS was abolished by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, . . . which largely abandoned
federal common law.”).
161. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 851 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that
most of the New York common law of unfair competition as recognized in Metro. Opera Ass’n v.
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff’d, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App.
Div. 1951) is preempted by section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act).
162. See UTSA, § 7, cmt. (“trade secrets” as used in Section 7 means “competitively significant
information”).
163. See BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 123 Hawaii 214 (2010); but see
Burbank Grease Services, LLC v. Sokolowski, 294 Wisc. 2d 274 (2006).
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competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting
commerce” and empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
enforce the law. 164 Section 5(n) of the FTC Act defines unlawful acts or
practices as those that “cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.” 165 Critical decisions over the past 100 years have defined
the scope of the FTC’s power and its ability to determine what constitutes
unfair or deceptive acts of practices in a manner that gives the FTC a lot
of power to regulate unfair business practices. 166 However, the FTC Act
does not create a private right of action, meaning that the ability to create
a federal common law of unfair competition that extends beyond the
Lanham Act is necessarily limited by the cases that the FTC chooses to
pursue.
As detailed previously, another reaction to Erie concerned trade
secret law, a branch of unfair competition law. Prior to Erie, trade secret
law (as then defined) was highly reliant upon the common law of the
states. 167 Because of the promulgation of the UTSA in 1979, its adoption
by all states except New York and North Carolina, and the 2016 enactment
of the DTSA, U.S. trade secret law is now governed nearly exclusively by
statutes. 168 In contrast to trademark law, however, state common and
decisional law is a significant underlying source of U.S. trade secret
principles due to the different ways that the two bodies of law developed
and the means by which gaps in trade secret and a trademark law were
filled post-Erie. 169 To put it simply, there was a larger body of state
common law with respect to trade secret principles from which federal
courts could draw post-Erie, and because most trade secret cases were
filed in state court (at least before the enactment of the DTSA), that law
continued to develop largely unabated. Also, whereas the scope of
164. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. 79-489 (July 5, 1946); 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
166. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 871, 873 (2010) (giving a history of the FTC Act and noting: “Today, the jurisdiction of the
FTC over anticompetitive practices is well established. Not only does the Commission have explicit
power to enforce the Clayton Act directly, but also the Supreme Court has held that the FTC’s power
to condemn ‘unfair methods of competition’ covers everything that the Sherman Act covers and goes
even further to reach a ‘penumbra’ of practices that are not covered by the Sherman Act.”).
167. Sandeen, supra note 9, at 496.
168. Supra note 143.
169. Compare Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493
(2010) (describing the development of U.S. trade secret law), with Mark McKenna, Trademark Law’s
Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
ed., 2013) (describing the development of trademark law).
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trademark protection has expanded post-Erie, trade secret protection
contracted with the adoption of the UTSA. 170
Of the types of unfair competition listed in the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition, the law governing rights of publicity is the only
body of law that is governed exclusively by state statutory and common
law. 171 Since Erie, this law has continued to develop through the
enactment of statutes by more states and the common law process, but in
fits and starts. 172 As a result, uniformity is mostly lacking. This body of
law, then, serves as a stark example of what U.S. trademark and trade
secret law might have looked like 80 years after Erie if policymakers and
members of the bar had not intervened to pass the Lanham Act and the
UTSA. When it comes to statutory solutions for perceived acts of unfair
competition, it also suggests that policymakers and members of the bar
are more motivated to protect the commercial interests of businesses than
the privacy interests of individuals.
V. CONCLUSION
In many respects, unfair competition law in the United States today
is much more robust than it was at the time Erie was decided in 1938, but
that is not because of the common law development of state unfair
competition law. Rather, it is because of the adoption and enforcement of
federal and state unfair competition statutes, including the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the Lanham Act, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and
the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016. But while numerous unfair
competition statutes exist and are enforced, they are also limited in ways
that the amorphous and ever-changing common law is not. This is partly
a result of Sears, Compco, and their progeny, but it is often by design as
legislatures struggle to define the fine line between fair and unfair
competition. Thus, two things are clear about the U.S. law of unfair
competition eighty years after Erie: it is largely defined by state and
federal statutes and it is limited in type and scope.

170. Sandeen, supra note 10, at 527–529.
171. David S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, Teaching Rights of Publicity: Blending Copyright
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905, 906–07 (2008) (“[U]nlike patent, trademark, and copyright, rights of publicity are governed by
a patchwork quilt of state statutes and common-law decisions, rather than by a single federal
statute; and unlike trade secret law, rights of publicity are not the subject of a uniform state law
adopted in the vast majority of states, in addition to a federal criminal law.”).
172. JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC
WORLD (2018).

